Uber’s buccaneering entry into regulated taxi markets in many cities prompts questions about the purpose of regulation and who benefits. While there is little academic literature on the topic, a 2016 paper* by Harding, Kandlikar and Gulati, focused on North American taxi markets, is illuminating. It is argued that the case for regulation is based on the view that the taxi market suffers from three problems: ‘credence good’, open access and thin market:
- A credence good is a good or service whose quality cannot be determined by the consumer until after it has been consumed. Questions about reliability of a taxi service may deter users who may be concerned about excess charges or a poor quality vehicle. Regulation that sets standards for quality and price overcomes such market failure.
- Open access to the market may attract large numbers of new entrants on account of low costs of entry. Given limited demand in the locality, earnings of drivers would fall, increasing the incentive to illegitimate charging and poor vehicle maintenance.
- A thin market has a small number of buyers and sellers, which reduces the chances of matching supply and demand. The taxi market is thin in that it is geographically dispersed. Regulation of fares prevents exploitation of users when demand exceeds supply.
The entry of Uber and similar ride hailing platforms impacts the taxi market in a number of ways:
- Barriers to entry for drivers are lowered, and users are attracted, shifting a thin market to a thick one.
- Fares flex according to demand but are specified before the trip is undertaken. Surge pricing attracts drivers to meet peaks of demand.
- Quality rating of both drivers and passengers, plus predictable fares, helps ensure consistent standards of service.
Thus the platforms address the shortcomings of traditional taxi markets that have justified regulation, effectively removing two of the rationales for taxi regulation, and largely mitigating the third (open access), Nevertheless, the implications of competition between platforms are as yet unclear. Competition could lead to instability on both supply and demand sides, which could result in collusion by platforms, to the disadvantage of drivers and passengers; while lack of competition may result in monopolistic pricing.
The paper concludes that regulators should allow the ride hailing market to grow and focus on the possibilities of future monopoly and of collusion between platforms.
*Taxi apps, regulation, and the market for taxi journeys. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 88, 15-25, 2016.