In our parliamentary system, the performance of the government (the executive) is supposed to be held to account by the elected MPs of the House of Commons, and ultimately of course by the electorate as a whole. In the field of transport, the key body to be tracked is the Department for Transport and the considerable number of its executive agencies with more specific transport delivery responsibilities, particularly those with, or who influence, large expenditures such as National Highways, the emerging Great British Railways, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the Office for Rail and Road. Some light is cast on all this in the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts published at the end of term before the summer parliamentary recess. But it is hardly a widely read tome – this year running to 372 densely packed pages – and one on which the Department’s top civil servants and their political masters are able to put their own spin.
Arguably, the Department is not in great shape, judged by its recent record. As a former civil servant, I am aware of the difficulties in assigning responsibilities, given the central role of politicians with manifestos to be implemented, and also given unanticipated events, of which the Covid pandemic is a good, albeit extreme example. Nevertheless, if decisions are to be ‘robust’ (a favourite appellation), a government department must be able to successfully navigate these swirling currents.
Too long a list of crashes and wrecks must raise doubts about competence and general approach. Recall the failure of cost control that led to truncation of HS2, and the failure to anticipate public anxieties about safety that led to the abandonment of the Smart Motorway programme that converted hard shoulders to running lanes – both instances of major policy failure that do not inspire confidence. The House of Commons Transport Committee was sharply critical of the Smart Motorway programme, a good example of how Parliament through its select committees can hold the executive to account and even on occasion to help change policy.
The National Audit Office (NAO) provided an overview of the DfT for the new Parliament in November 2024, assessing the nine principal risks faced by the DfT and its arm’s-length bodies, and concluding that only a couple of items had decreased in severity in the past year. Noteworthy shortcomings were the Department’s inability to deliver its major projects to time or cost or deliver the expected benefits; inability to deliver sufficient carbon savings, inability to adequately maintain infrastructure, and to make adequate forecasts of future travel demand or changes in the transport system, thus resulting in ineffective decision making.
Regular readers of this blog will be aware of my particular worry concerning deficiencies in the Department’s analytical function, which has led to misconceived policies. The DfT has prided itself on the rigour of its approach to the cost-benefits analysis of transport investments. As further impacts of such investments are identified, additional units are bolted on to the main Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG) framework, for instance the methodology for quantifying agglomeration benefits that I recently discussed.
The consequence has been the enormous growth of TAG, which has now reached 1700 pages (I have counted), not including data and software. This contrasts with the Appraisal Guide of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), which covers a similar range of topics to TAG, but in a succinct 174 pages.
This ten-fold difference in pages count arguably reflects the DfT’s wish to micro-manage its clients, whereas the MHCLG is content to set out the principles and allow those concerned to use their judgement about what is useful and necessary to construct an investment case. The problem is that the DfT approach requires an enormous amount of effort to comply on the part of public sector transport undertakings, their consultants, and the departmental officials who vet the investment cases – effort which is not justified by the outcomes of the appraisal process.
For instance, the DfT’s 2021 Integrated Rail Plan for the North and the Midlands admitted that ‘Rail schemes in the North are at increased risk of being considered poor value for money when applying conventional cost–benefit analysis. This is driven in part by smaller city populations in the North, different travel patterns, as well as the general high cost of building rail infrastructure’. So, it seems now to be the case that rail investment decisions are likely to be based on political judgement rather than complex and nugatory economic appraisal.
More generally, the benefits of transport investment substantially take the form of enhanced access, rather than the saving of travel time, as I have argued in some detail in my latest book, which means that the excessively elaborate TAG methodology rests on insecure foundations. It is time to take the proverbial axe (or is it nowadays the chainsaw?) to the DfT’s analytical function, both the documentation and the personnel involved, and to shift the focus from investment in new infrastructure to real issues of current policy concern.
Encouragingly, the House of Commons Transport Committee seems to be again on the case and is holding a number of inquiries this autumn, notably into joined up travel provision, taxi regulation, and skills for transport manufacturing. Some thoughts on these below.
Joined up journeys: achieving transport integration
Last year, in the wake of Labour’s General Election victory and the arrival of Louise Haigh as Secretary of State, the Department for Transport sought inputs to the development of an Integrated National Transport Strategy, intended to set the high-level direction for how transport should be designed, built and operated in England over the next 10 years. This is proving a lengthy process, probably not helped by the early change of Transport Secretary herself, and the learning curve of the junior minister in charge.
Besides, the DfT is now seeking to recruit a Director General for Transport Strategy to provide strategic leadership across a ‘multi-modal and cross-cutting portfolio’, with responsibility for a range of themes including transport strategy, science, AI, data and decarbonisation agendas. In contrast to this high-level view, the Transport Committee is focusing on the achievement of joined-up journeys, asking about the key features that make a transport system feel cohesive and more accessible to the user.
Joined-up transport is naturally to be desired. There are examples of achievements, but also of failed attempts and failures to attempt, all of which illuminate both the barriers to integration and how these can be overcome. The obstacles can be operational, organisational and economic. Sometimes operational or economic obstacles can be overcome through a change of organisational arrangements. I offer below some illuminating examples but do not attempt a systematic or theoretical analysis.
The leading example in the UK of urban joined-up transport is in London, where Transport for London (TfL) operates an integrated public transport system involving relatively high frequency services, cashless payments, advance journey planning, real time tracking of buses and trains, while increasing accessibility to meet the diverse needs of users. High frequency services minimise delays when commencing and changing services, allowing users to ‘turn up and go’, rather than having recourse to a timetable.
The adoption of on-street competition of bus services outside London in the nineteen eighties was a politically-driven policy intended to promote economic efficiency, but at the cost of integration benefits. The competition authorities even frowned upon measures that would promote collaboration between competing bus operators. Experience has meanwhile shown the benefits of the London model of integration, and the move to franchising, effected in Manchester and planned elsewhere, should allow more joined-up journeys to be made. Interestingly, the new buses re-regulation legislation now going through parliament is ‘permissive’ about which approaches to take locally, and some welcome experimentation is being provided for and encouraged by the Department.
Another example of long-established service integration is the timetabling of ferry services in Scotland to meet connecting trains. To cite my own experience by way of example, I have departed from London before midnight on the Caledonian Sleeper, arriving at Glasgow Central station in time to walk to Queen Street station to get the West Highland Line to Oban, which connects with the CalMac ferry to Castlebay on Barra in the Outer Hebrides – a eighteen-hour joined-up trip for a total change of scenery.
A far more extensive case of service integration involving multiple travel services is found in Switzerland, which has an admired public transport system characterized by its extensive network, seamless integration between different modes of transport, and adherence to a punctual timetable. Trains, buses, and other forms of transport operate at fixed intervals, often every 15, 20, 30, or 60 minutes, with departures at the same minute past the hour from each stop, known as the ‘Taktfahrplan’. This illustrates how lower frequency services can form part of a joined-up system designed to minimise waiting time and facilitate interconnections, for the benefits of users.
New transport modes can facilitate joined-up travel, such as e- bikes, e-scooters and new forms of car share. The best example is Uber, which pioneered ride-hailing, a taxi service that has proved very popular. A single mobile phone app, with its associated payment system, functions in all locations where the service is available, in UK cities and abroad. This facilitates joined-up travel involving a taxi stage, particularly beneficial in places where local taxis are of uncertain reliability, although is not yet regarded as part of the overall public transport system in the UK.
In other situations, no regard is had to the benefits of joined-up travel, for instance airports that require arrival 2-3 hours prior to departure, to allow for delays in checking-in, security and boarding. For travellers, investment to reduce queues is likely to be more cost-effective than adding runway or terminal capacity.
Another example of disregard of joined-up benefits arose when adjacent London boroughs authorised different providers of the newly arriving commercial rental e-bikes and e-scooters. Hounslow Council recently switched from Lime to Forest and Voi while the adjacent borough of Richmond authorises Lime bikes but not Forest and Voi. Hounslow’s decision to appoint Forest and Voi followed a competitive procurement process, but the result has been a mass of abandoned cycles at a busy ‘border’ point between two London Boroughs because a bike’s electric motor cuts out once riders enter the neighbouring borough. This is further instance of the potential conflict between seeking efficiency benefits from competition between operators and achieving benefits from service integration – and a challenge to the necessary regulatory and supervisory framework we might expect from the DfT.
The concept of Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) has attracted much attention in recent years from transport planners and academic analysts – and might appeal to ministers as a concept to promote in any integrated transport plan. The proposition is that if a full range of transport services could be offered on demand, users would be able to minimise car use or even avoid car ownership. The motivation is concern about the adverse environmental and societal impact of the car, and the outcome would be a joined-up multimodal offering.
However, the MaaS concept has proved difficult to implement in practice on account of the operational challenges of providing multimodal alternatives to the private car, in contrast to single mode provision of services such as ride-hailing taxis, street-based car or e-bike rental. Moreover, the private car has many attractions, such that three quarters of UK households own at least one vehicle.
Commercially, MaaS has proved problematical when implemented. Difficulties experienced include lack of user uptake, financial sustainability, integration of the different modes, and lack of a clear value proposition. The original start-up business based in Helsinki that pioneered application of the concept filed for bankruptcy in 2024. A MaaS project in the Solent region of the UK aims to integrate various transportation options into a single mobile app for easier planning, booking, and payment of journeys. The project is part of the Solent Future Transport Zone funded by the Department for Transport. It remains to be seen whether a financially viable service will be achieved by the time the grant runs out.
Public transport operators have the financial heft to enlarge their offering through a MaaS approach. On the other hand, the MaaS unitary payment system comes between the public transport operator and its customers, which may slow cash flow and reduce knowledge of user behaviour. Nevertheless, five years ago the Berlin public transport company instigated a MaaS system, known as ‘Jelbi’, that integrates transportation options including public transport, bike rental, e-scooter, car sharing and taxi (but not ride-hailing) into a single app. In contrast, TfL has shown no signs of any similar initiative, perhaps on account of the availability in London of many independent cashless-payment transport options and routing apps.
Competition between providers may benefit users through lower prices but inhibit valued service integration. Single ownership of many modes facilitates integration but at the potential loss of efficiency and thus higher prices. Partnerships may be difficult to achieve on account of conflicting interests, but once established may prove durable. There may be scope for interventions to foster transport integration, effected by placing a duty on regulators and public authorities to have regard to the benefits from integration when carrying out their functions and avoiding barriers that inhibit joined-up journeys
Licensing of taxis and private hire vehicles
New forms of shared car provision often fall foul of an ancient legislative regime still in place, dating back to the original hackney cabs. Sensibly, alongside its inquiry into transport integration, the Transport Committee is asking whether current licensing arrangements enable local authorities to effectively regulate and oversee the taxi and private hire vehicle (PHV) sector across England. I have previously discussed the regulation of transport sector services generally, noting the contrast between the historic regulatory regime that nevertheless governs innovative business models such as ride-hailing, exemplified by Uber, and the forward-looking approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles that would apply to driverless taxis (‘robotaxis’).
There is some uncertainty about the feasibility of deploying robotaxis in British cities, which have historic narrow residential streets, often with cars parked on both sides, requiring negotiation between vehicles approaching in opposite directions. This could be challenging for any kind of driverless vehicle, particularly so for a taxi that must be able to gain access to every street address by a reasonably direct route.
Moreover, there are complicated situations to be managed, such as pick-up and drop-off (‘PUDO’ events) at airports, stations and often at kerbside. And there is a question as to what extent the saving in driver costs compared with conventional taxis would be offset by increased capital costs of automated vehicles plus the costs of oversight, and whether any net cost saving would result in lower fares. Nevertheless, proponents of driverless technology hope that such impediments will be overcome and questions answered satisfactorily, so that the regulatory regime should be in place on the assumption that this optimism will be justified.
The Automated Vehicles Act 2024 provides for the Secretary of State to authorise a road vehicle to operate as an AV and to make regulations for the licensing of ‘no-user-in-charge’ operators. This would apply to robotaxi operators, who should have general responsibility for the detection of, and response to, problems arising during a no-user-in-charge journey overseen by the operator.
The DfT issued a consultation document in July concerning an ‘Automated Passenger Services (APS) permitting scheme’, intended to provide a clear legal route, by means of a statutory instrument made under the Act, to deploying commercial passenger services with no human driver, so providing certainty for operators to enter the market. An APS permit for taxis and PHVs in England would be granted by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA), but only with the consent of the licensing authority for where the service is provided, to ensure consideration is given to local issues relating to policy and standards for taxi and PHV licensing. For services that have been granted an APS permit, taxi and PHV legislation will be disapplied. The APS permitting scheme does not replace the existing licensing routes for passenger-carrying vehicles, instead it sits alongside them as an additional regulatory route specifically for self-driving vehicles.
Disapplication of the standard licensing arrangement for robotaxis is of course appropriate for conditions relating to driver qualifications. But disapplication to other aspects is more problematic. One issue for local authorities considering consent for a robotaxi service relates to the non-driving related roles carried out by drivers of conventional taxis and PHVs. A review commissioned by the DfT has identified no less than 66 such roles, of which 21 were judged challenging or impossible to fulfil in the absence of a driver, for instance helping a passenger using mobility aids get into and out of the vehicle.
Local authorities could take different views about the importance of such non-driving roles, which could affect their willingness to give consent to local permitting of robotaxis, resulting in inconsistent practice across the country. Such considerations could prompt local authorities to limit the scale of robotaxi operations, to ensure the availability of some conventional taxis for those passengers that require assistance; or even to reject robotaxis altogether, having the effect of protecting the employment of taxi drivers – arguably not an aim of public policy. The DfT is planning to issue guidance for consenting authorities, but it seems that they will be allowed wide discretion when considering local issues relating to policy and standards for taxi and PHV licensing
The effect of the proposed regulatory regime for robotaxis is to create a carve-out from the historic regulatory regime for one specific kind of technological innovation. This would leave other innovations subject to historic regulation that is unresponsive to new technologies or business models that could benefit users. Ride-hailing, such as provided by Uber, is the main current instance, but others might yet arise as AI begins to impact on the transport sector.
There is therefore a good case for the reform and modernisation of the regulatory regime for taxis and PHVs to recognise the benefits for users of innovation, both of technology and business models, and to create a level playing field for all kinds of innovators. A duty on regulators to foster innovation would be a desirable measure.
Skills for transport manufacturing
Another new inquiry of the Transport Committee is concerned with skills for the manufacturing of motor vehicles, buses, aeroplanes, trains and ships, as opposed the skills for transport operations, for instance train delays and cancellations due to driver shortages attributed to lack of driver training during the coronavirus pandemic. The latter would be for the DfT, but skills generally are now the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions where the skills brief is being tied directly to welfare, employability and economic growth. Moreover, the Transport Committee cites the Department for Business and Trade’s Modern Industrial Strategy, issued in June 2025,in which the aerospace and automotive sectors are picked out for particular attention. So, it is unclear where responsibilities for transport manufacturing skills would fall within government. But the DfT would have an interest in skills relevant to transport decarbonisation technologies, particularly electric road vehicles.
I recently commented on major developments underway in automotive manufacturing that are relevant to future skills requirements. In brief, a potentially major AI application would be commercially viable road vehicle automation, but the slow rate of progress is striking. There is a clash between both the approach to innovation and the organisational structure required for successful digital businesses and that traditionally seen as appropriate for road vehicle manufacture. Hence putting digital and traditional mechanical/electrical engineering technologies together in a single product, the state-of-the-art modern car, has proved difficult. This is particularly so for the legacy auto manufacturers, even at the present early stage of vehicle automation involving driver assistance and ‘infotainment’ – in-vehicle access to media and navigation, often via a personal smartphone. The transition to ‘driverless’ operations would be even more demanding since the solution suppliers are not in a position to fully control the operational environment on roads.
A major complication for the car industry is how, at the same time as pursuing automation, to accommodate the switch to electric propulsion, involving another new type of technology – battery chemistry – with many potentially conflicting requirements including energy storage, rate of power delivery, rate of charging, decline in performance over time, weight, safety and flammability.
The changing nature of the car has implications for the skills of the workforce. The core competences of traditional car manufacturing were internal combustion engine design and manufacture, body pressing (in-house or outsourced), the assembly line, marketing and sales through dealers. Other components were bought in, including electricals, suspensions, brakes, and tyres. The core professional discipline has been mechanical engineering, and the main part of the workforce has been semi-skilled on the assembly line, the requirement for which is lessening with the progressive introduction of factory robots.
The technological developments outlined above imply major changes to professional disciplines and skills, as well as to the management of the integration of digital, electrochemical and traditional technologies. In some cases, the challenges are newsworthy. Recent headlines from a well-informed business publication have included: ‘Toyota’s Internal Inertia Stifles Digital Transformation Effort’. And an industry commentator has observed: ‘For years, Volkswagen’s software unit symbolized everything that went wrong with digital transformation’, the consequence of old structures and cultures, as well as competing power dynamics between traditional managers and digital innovators.
One question that arises is to what extent the workforce should comprise specialists, such as mechanical engineers and operatives, or individuals with broader capabilities, both hands-on production and the ability to see and advocate opportunities for improvement, as for instance the Kaizen concept pioneered in Japan of continuous improvement, requiring the participation of employees at all levels. A related question is the extent to which individuals are attracted to employment in innovative and successful businesses, taking personal responsibility to acquire skills both to gain entry and to advance, as exemplified by a career in medicine; as opposed to acquiring skills while in education from the menu on offer, without a clear idea of ultimate employment.
England has not been effective at implementing apprenticeship schemes. On the other hand, we are successful at getting students into higher education, with almost half of state school pupils having started higher education by age 25 in 2022/23. Yet has been recently reported that the number of roles advertised for recent graduates is down 33% compared with last year and is at the lowest level in seven years, with a lack of entry-level opportunities. This suggests the possibility of creating a graduate entry route into car manufacturing, beyond the traditional management or professional trainee, to encompass those willing to engage in production tasks but with the ability to participate in the process of productivity improvement and integration of diverse technologies.
Arguably, we should follow the example of digital businesses that focus on the rapid adoption of innovative technologies for the kind of success that would attract the most able individuals, in contrast to the state of the UK’s mass production car industry, whose prospects are particularly unclear given the technological changes outlined above, competition from Chinese manufacturers, and the fact that none of the businesses are headquartered in Britain.
Is the Department for Transport fit for purpose?
The recommendations of the Transport Committee from the three inquiries underway are likely to pose an implementation challenge for the DfT if they were accepted, which is why, based on previous experience, many might be side-stepped. Reform of taxi regulation and promotion of joined-up services could be put in the ‘too difficult’ category, while responsibility for manufacturing skills could be directed to other departments.
This brings us back to the issue of both the DfT’s mission, processes, and stewardship. It might be that the Transport Committee needs to look hard at how the DfT operates as much as the individual policies it pursues. That would be a valuable inquiry in its own right and maybe the key to ensuring all its detailed researches bring about some worthwhile changes, rather than the reports being simply noted, and put on the ‘not now please‘ shelf.
This blog post is the basis for a commentary in Local Transport Today of 15 October 2025.